The Tragedy of the Commons

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Meaning of the Tragedy of the Commons

The "Tragedy of the Commons" refers to a paper which was written by biologist Garret Hardin in 1968 [1]. He used the expression as a metaphor for the problems of overuse and degradation of natural resources including the destruction of fisheries, the over harvesting of timber, and the degradation of water resources[2]. The word tragedy applies in this article to the depletion of the common fish resources. The term commons does not imply the absence of property rights, as a crucial distinction must be made between common property and open access. Common property systems have recognized users, agreed rules, and institutions for monitoring and enforcement, whereas open-access systems lack effective control over access and use. Hardin’s original model describes primarily an open-access regime rather than a true commons governed by collective rules[3][4].

Hardin's analysis focused on a pasture that herders use in common for grazing their cattle. There are no problems with the common usage of the pasture until the number of animals reaches the carrying capacity of the pasture. In order to gain extra profits, herders add additional animals to the common pasture. The problem is that each additional animal means more grazing in the pasture, and the continual addition of animals eventually leads to overgrazing of the pasture. The end result is the destruction of the pasture. In the words of Hardin, "each man is locked into a system that compels him to increase his herd without limit-in a world that is limited"[1].

Fishery in the Tragedy of the Commons scenario

Fisheries are similar to Hardin’s pasture in that increased fishing pressure has caused certain stocks of fish to become overfished to a point that threatens the survival of the fishery. All the conditions described by Hardin are met in this case: an unrestricted number of users, unfettered by any limits on their access, extract an increasing share of a resource until natural resources are severely depleted. Fishers tend to have little incentive to practice conservation, for they know that if they do not catch the available fish, someone else probably will[5] Overfishing is often not only the result of individual free-riding behavior, but also of broader political and economic drivers such as fishing subsidies, pressure to maintain employment in coastal communities, international seafood markets, and lobbying by industrial fishing interests. These factors can encourage overcapacity and delay necessary management measures even when risks are well known[6][7].

According to Shepherd (2003[8]), fish resources all over the world are in danger of extinction, the major risks being:

  • An excessive fishing fleet capacity and fishing effort
  • Depleted fish stock
  • Low profitability (operating surpluses near zero)
  • High inter-annual variability of stock size and catches
  • Excessive risk of collapse of fish stocks

It should be noted that alongside these factors others such as water pollution in particular with heavy metals, persistent organic pollutants, nutrients from agriculture and oil, in marine and coastal areas have also played a decisive role in the reducing fish stocks[9]. The oceans have been called a common heritage resource – they belong to everyone and no one. But under the 1982 Law of the Sea, agreed to under United Nations auspices, nation can claim territorial rights to many important offshore fisheries. They can then limit access these fisheries by requiring fishing licenses.

Critique of the Tragedy of the Commons Model

The tragedy of the commons is a simplistic and fairly abstract model. Factors such as regulating mechanisms and community sanctions are not accounted for in the theory, as the assumption is made that common property means open access to all[4]. Many assert that what the theory describes is not a true commons, but an open access regime or free-for-all situation, where no authority has any control[10]. One would be hard pressed to find a scenario where a natural resource is being used and a true free-for-all situation exists, particularly in the more populated areas of the world. In most instances of resource exploitation, the state plays a regulatory role, to maximize the capital gains from the resource and ensure conservation[10]. The inevitability of the tragedy of the commons theory then becomes questionable, as these regulatory mechanisms are not accounted for. In the case of the Northwest Atlantic fishery, the Canadian Federal government was heavily involved in the regulation and management of the fishery, primarily through the federal Department of Fisheries and Oceans (DFO). The role of government management/mismanagement is crucial to the discussion of the Newfoundland fishery and its collapse. Appendix B illustrates that resource depletion may result not only from lack of regulation, but also from inadequate governance. Scientific warnings were underestimated, quotas remained too high, and political pressure to protect employment delayed restrictive measures. This suggests that the problem was not simply a tragedy of the commons, but also a failure of centralized management.

Other environmental factors that have been implicated include greater predation of cod by seals because of the decreased seal hunt, and an increase in the mortality of capelin, one of the cod's main food sources[11]. Ecosystem changes such as predator-prey interactions, climate variability, habitat degradation, and pollution can strongly influence fish stocks and may interact with fishing pressure. Effective fisheries management therefore requires an ecosystem-based approach that considers both human exploitation and environmental change rather than treating overfishing as an isolated problem. Many of these environmental factors had impacts on the Cod stocks, but one must still look back to government mismanagement and overfishing as primary causes. This is not to discount environmental factors, but to suggest that they probably factored in at the most inopportune time[12].


Avoiding the Tragedy of the Commons

Elinor Ostrom (1990[3]) identified several governance principles for the sustainable management of common-pool resources:

The resource boundaries and the legitimate users must be clearly defined. Rules for resource use should be adapted to local ecological and social conditions and be perceived as fair. Users should be able to participate in setting and modifying these rules.

Effective monitoring of both the resource and user behavior is essential, together with graduated sanctions for rule violations and accessible mechanisms for conflict resolution.

Local users must have the recognized right to organize and manage the resource system. When the resource is part of a larger system, governance should be organized in multiple connected levels, linking local management to broader regional and national institutions.

Ostrom shows that the tragedy of the commons is not inevitable. Many local communities around the world have successfully managed forests, fisheries, irrigation systems, and grazing lands for long periods without privatization or strict central control. Sustainable outcomes depend largely on the presence of legitimate institutions, shared rules, trust, monitoring, and collective responsibility.


Two fishery examples of the Tragedy of the Commons are discussed in the appendices A and B,


Appendix A: The Tuna Example

Figure 1:The Bluefin Tuna (Thunnus thynnus), Source: NOAA's National Marine Fisheries Service

Tuna are several species of ocean-dwelling fish in the family Scombridae, mostly in the genus Thunnus. Tunas are fast swimmers—they have been clocked at 70 km/h (43 mph)—and include several species that are warm-blooded. Tunas are sub-classified into five genera (Thunnus, Euthynnus, Katsuwonus, Auxis and Allothunnus) with fifteen species altogether. They are all oceanic, capable of long migrations or movements[13]. Total catch of the five main tuna species expanded quite strongly between 1985- 2005: from 2.16 million MT to over 4.2 million MT, The main tuna catching nations are concentrated in Asia, with Japan and Taiwan (Province of China) as the main producers. Other important tuna catching nations in Asia are Indonesia, the Republic of Korea and the Philippines[14].


Figure 2: Review of Global Tuna Trade and Major Markets Source: David James Consultant FAO and Helga Josupeit, Fish Utilization and Marketing Service FAO, Power Point Presentation 2007

Growing demand for tuna products has been stimulating increases in the catches. At the same time, demand for tuna has been keeping prices at levels that have ensured adequate income for all stakeholders. However, in the case of some species such as skipjack continuous high exploitation has created an excess of supply, causing prices, and therefore income of operators, to decline.

Management of tuna

There are five regional bodies responsible for managing tuna stocks:

The five met together for the first time in Kobe, Japan in January 2007. The meeting concluded with an action plan drafted by some 60 countries or areas. Concrete steps include issuing certificates of origin to prevent illegal fishing and greater transparency in the setting of regional fishing quotas.

The case of the Atlantic bluefin tuna (Thunnus thynnus)

Atlantic, Pacific and southern bluefin contribute relatively little in terms of volume to the total catches of principal market tunas, but their individual value is high due to their use for sashimi and sushi (Japanese delicacy). These fish are migratory and are known to traverse the Atlantic Ocean in a few months. Bluefin tuna are among the largest bony fish in the ocean, reaching over 3.05 meters in length and over 500 kilograms in weight. Their lifespan can exceed 30 years, making them long lived among fish species [15].

Figure 3: Distribution of the Atlantic and Pacific bluefin tunas and their respective fisheries operation area Source: Allen, R. L. 2002. Global tuna resources: limits to growth and sustainability, page 164

Catches of Atlantic bluefin followed a generally declining trend from the early 1950s to the early 1970s [16]. The Atlantic population of the species has declined by nearly 90 percent since the 1970s [17]. Atlantic bluefin tuna take eight years to mature to large-medium sized fish. Scientists believe that the decline in the numbers of larger sized bluefin tuna can be attributed to the high volume of juvenile bluefin tuna caught. The problem is that fishers catch so many juvenile bluefin tunas that there are none left to mature [18].

There are two ways to save the Atlantic bluefin tuna stock- protect them in their breeding grounds and in their feeding grounds. This will require immediate action in both the central Atlantic, to reduce the mortality of the giant bluefin while foraging, and in the Gulf of Mexico and Mediterranean, where bluefin breed as discrete populations [19].

The International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tuna (ICCAT) has recommended, in light of severe stress on the Atlantic Ocean’s population of bluefin tuna that, for the indefinite future, no commercial fishing for juvenile fish or this species is allowed[18].

Figure 4:The Bluefin Tuna (Thunnus thynnus), Bluefin tuna stock in the Mediterranean is threatened by overfishing and illegal fishing Source: Brian Skerry / National Geographic Image Collection

Conclusion

It is difficult to be prescriptive regarding what is an appropriate extractive policy for a fishery; the policy will differ depending on the individual characteristics of the fishery, the fishers and the objectives of the property right holder. Some form of regulation is needed in a fishery to prevent the “Tragedy of the Commons” – where individual fishers are motivated to operate beyond the maximum sustainable yield, often leading to biological and economic over-exploitation. Without a clearly defined set of policies, the consequent institutions may not achieve a desired result[20].


Appendix B: the Newfoundland's cod crisis

The 1992 moratorium on fishing for Northern Cod (Gadus morhua), announced by the Canadian Federal Minister of Fisheries and Oceans, marked a symbolic end to the way of life that had sustained Newfoundland’s outports for hundreds of years. It also marked the completion of an ecological regime shift, from an ocean ecosystem dominated by cod and other predatory groundfish, to one in which such fish are comparatively scarce, and lower-trophic-level invertebrates more common. Around 19,000 fishers and workers related to fishing activities were directly affected and up to 20,000 other jobs were lost or harmed[21].

Map of the province of Newfoundland and Labrador, Canada.
The Atlantic Cod, Gadus morhua Linnaeus,1758. Source: Craasmann, A.

Overfishing

Many authors have cited overfishing as the cause of the cod stock collapse[22][23][24]. In the case of the Newfoundland cod, there were three distinct groups involved in harvesting the resource: local inshore fishermen, Canadian draggers and trawlers, and deep-sea foreign fishing vessels.

Collapse of Atlantic Cod Stocks Off the East Coast of Newfoundland in 1992.

Government Management

The government's involvement in the fishery is best explained by a statement made by Sinclair (1992[25]). Since 1977, the Government of Canada has been the manager of the fisheries. Instead of fish being a resource available to anyone with the means to catch them [i.e. a commons], they became state property, the rights to which were delegated in the management plans. Therefore, the management policy of the Canadian state has become a major factor in the condition of the industry since this time" (p. 93). The Federal government, through the DFO, controlled the number of fishermen through licensing systems, set quotas for different types of vessels, and, acting upon information from its own scientists, set the Total Allowable Catch (TAC) for the industry each year[26][27]. So quite obviously, a lot of the blame for the overfishing has to be placed there, as the DFO told the fishermen what they could go out and get. Acting upon faulty data , the DFO licensed too many fishermen and set TAC's that were too high[12].

Fishery in the tragedy of the commons scenario

Following Ophuls' model of a fishery in the tragedy of the commons, once the critical point was reached, either privatization or collapse would occur. It is easy to see how the collapse of the Newfoundland fishery could have been a tragedy of the commons, with the many groups and countries that were taking from the resource base. Given the conditions necessary for a tragedy of the commons, and its ultimate outcome, the Newfoundland cod stock collapse would then have to be considered inevitable and unavoidable. However, the proposition that the Newfoundland's cod crisis fits in the tragedy of the commons is not accepted by many environmental specialists, due to its simplistic arguments[12].

The Tragedy of State Mismanagement

As the exploitation of the Newfoundland fishery was so predominantly guided by the government, the (mis)management of the fishery and its subsequent collapse match well with ideas put forth by Marchak (1987)[10]. In her book Uncommon Property. Marchak calls this "the tragedy of state mismanagement" theory (unit 4, p. 3). She argues that a fishery is not a true commons, as the fisher lacks management rights normally associated with property and common property. The state has appropriated the property, and makes all of the management decisions. Fishermen get told who can fish, what they can fish, and essentially, what to do with the fish once it is caught. In this regard then, when a resource such as the Newfoundland fishery collapses, it is more a tragedy of state mismanagement than a tragedy of the commons.


Related articles

Carrying capacity analysis
Effects of fisheries on marine biodiversity
Legislation for the sea
EU Common Fisheries Policy (CFP)

External links

Tragedy of the commons
Economics of fisheries- Encyclopedia of Earth


Further reading

Robert J. Smith 1981. Resolving the Tragedy of the Commons by Creating Private Property Rights in Wildlife. Cato Journal, Vol. 1, No. 2, pp. 439-468.


References

  1. ↑ 1.0 1.1 Hardin, G. 1968. The Tragedy of the Commons. Science, 162, 1243-1248
  2. ↑ Ostrom, E., Burger, J., Field, C.B., Norgaard, R.B. and Policansky, D. 1999. Revisiting the Commons: Local Lessons, Global Challenges. Science 284 (5412): 278
  3. ↑ 3.0 3.1 Ostrom, E. 1990. Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action. Cambridge University Press.
  4. ↑ 4.0 4.1 McCay, B.J. and Acheson, J.M. (eds.) 1987. The Question of the Commons: The Culture and Ecology of Communal Resources. University of Arizona Press.
  5. ↑ Harris, J. and Codur, A-M. (Lead Authors) 2008. Economics of fisheries. In: Encyclopedia of Earth. (Eds. Cutler J.) Cleveland Global Development and Environment Institute.
  6. ↑ Sumaila, U.R., Khan, A., Dyck, A., Watson, R., Munro, G., Tydemers, P. and Pauly, D. 2010. A Bottom-Up Re-estimation of Global Fisheries Subsidies. Journal of Bioeconomics 12: 201–225
  7. ↑ Hilborn, R., Orensanz, J.M. and Parma, A.M. 2005. Institutions, Incentives and the Future of Fisheries. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B 360: 47–57
  8. ↑ Shepherd, J.G 2003. Economic Aspects of Fisheries Management. In: Sustainable Fisheries: Myth or Mirage School of Ocean & Earth Science, University of Southampton
  9. ↑ UNEP 2000. The State of Environment- Europe and Central Asia, Marine and coastal area. UNEP Global Environment Outlook 2000
  10. ↑ 10.0 10.1 10.2 Marchak, P. 1987. Uncommon property. In P. Marchak, N. Guppy, & J. McMullan (Eds.), Uncommon property: The fishing and fish-processing industries in British Columbia. Toronto, Ontario, Canada: Methuen Publications.
  11. ↑ Steele, D. H., Andersen, R., & Green, J.M. 1992. The managed commercial annihilation of northern cod. Newfoundland Studies 8: 34-68
  12. ↑ 12.0 12.1 12.2 Mason, F. 2002. The Newfoundland Cod Stock Collapse: A Review and Analysis of Social Factors. Electronic Green Journal, 17 Cite error: Invalid <ref> tag; name "M2" defined multiple times with different content
  13. ↑ Allen, R. L. 2002. Global tuna resources: limits to growth and sustainability. In S. Subasinghe & P. Sudari eds. Global tuna industry situation and outlook: resources, production & marketing trends and technological issues. Proceedings of the Tuna 2002 Kuala Lumpur, 7th INFOFISH World Tuna Trade Conference, pp. 3-12
  14. ↑ Josupeit, H. 2004. Global World Tuna Markets” INFOFISH TUNA CONFERENCE 3-5 June 2004, Bangkok, Thailand, Food and Agriculture Organisation
  15. ↑ Committee to Review Atlantic Bluefin Tuna 1994. An Assessment of Atlantic Bluefin Tuna. Ocean Studies Board, Commission on Geosciences, Environment and Resources (CGER), National Academy Press, p. 5
  16. ↑ Allen, R. L. 2002. Global tuna resources: limits to growth and sustainability. In S. Subasinghe & P. Sudari, eds. Global tuna industry situation and outlook: resources, production & marketing trends and technological issues, p. 168
  17. ↑ Safina 1996. Thunnus thynnus. 2006 IUCN Red List of Threatened Species
  18. ↑ 18.0 18.1 Nickler, P. 1999. A tragedy of the commons in coastal fisheries: Contending prescriptions for conservation, and the case of the Atlantic bluefin tuna, p. 3
  19. ↑ Radford, T. 2005. Scientists call for urgent action to save Atlantic Tuna, The Guardian, April 28 2005
  20. ↑ Peterson, E.H. 2006. The Case of Pacific Tuna. Institutional Economics and Fisheries Management, p. 40
  21. ↑ Steele, D. H., Andersen, R. and Green, J.M. 1992. The managed commercial annihilation of northern cod. Newfoundland Studies 8: 34-68
  22. ↑ Sinclair, P. R. 1996. Sustainable development in fisheries dependant regions? Reflections on Newfoundland Cod fisheries. Sociologia Ruralis 36: 225-235.
  23. ↑ Hannesson, R. 1996. Fisheries (mis)management: The case of the north Atlantic cod. Oxford, England: Fishing News Books
  24. ↑ Finlayson, A. C. 1994. Fishing for truth: A sociological analysis of northern cod stock assessments from 1977-1990. St. John's, Newfoundland, Canada: Memorial University of Newfoundland, Institute of Social and Economic Research.
  25. ↑ Sinclair, P. R. 1992. Atlantic Canada's fishing communities: The impact of change. In D. A. Hay, & G. S. Basran (Eds.), Rural sociology in Canada. Don Mills, Ontario, Canada: Oxford University Press.
  26. ↑ McGraw, D. 1996. Course manual, Sociology/Anthropology 3322 (7th ed.). St. John's, Newfoundland, Canada: Memorial University of Newfoundland, Division of Continuing Education
  27. ↑ Palmer, C. and Sinclair, P. 1997. When the fish are gone: Ecological disaster and fishers in Northwest Newfoundland. Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada: Fernwood Publishing


The main author of this article is Caroline Krause
Please note that others may also have edited the contents of this article.
Citation: Caroline Krause (2026): The Tragedy of the Commons. Available from http://www.coastalwiki.org/wiki/The_Tragedy_of_the_Commons [accessed on 26-04-2026]


The main author of this article is Alvaro Miranda Oliveira
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